Al-Burhan Raises the Ceiling of Messages: Why Did He Choose to Attack the UAE and Mossad Boulos in Front of Top Army Com
14 December, 2025
In a forceful and sharply worded address carrying notable domestic and regional political messages, the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council — Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces — General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan delivered unprecedented criticism of the United Arab Emirates, describing its presence within the “Quad” mechanism as rendering it “far from impartial.” He also attacked the narrative promoted by Mossad Boulos, Senior Advisor to the U.S. President for Middle East and Africa Affairs, regarding the “Muslim Brotherhood’s infiltration of the army.”
This came during a meeting with senior officers of the military establishment at a sensitive moment marked by intensifying operations and growing international pressure to revive the political process through options the leadership considers unacceptable or intrusive.
The speech, in its timing and its content, cannot be read as a mere reaction to Emirati, American, or British positions. Rather, at its core, it represents a reorientation of the Sudanese state’s approach toward mediation frameworks and a redrawing of red lines in its relations with regional and international actors. It also raises expectations surrounding the Saudi Crown Prince’s initiative and President Trump’s emerging proposal on Sudan — initiatives that appear closer to Sudanese aspirations for peace and to the leadership’s position rejecting any political role for the Rapid Support Forces or their backers.
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First: Why Did al-Burhan Choose to Attack the UAE Now?
1. A Critical Military Moment
The army is currently conducting its most extensive operations in the Kordofan and Darfur theaters. This phase requires a military narrative aligned with the needs of the moment:
• Boosting troop morale and expanding mobilization and public support.
• Reinforcing the narrative of an “external enemy” backing the insurgency.
• Blocking any international pressure for a ceasefire at a time when the army is regaining momentum and reshaping the official Sudanese narrative.
• Maximizing gains from the shift in international attitudes toward the war.
By linking battlefield gains with the rejection of what he called a “compromised Emirati mediation,” al-Burhan signals that external intervention at this moment would undermine the army’s momentum and that Sudan is now openly distinguishing between actors that support the state and those backing the insurgency. The era of the “grey zone,” he suggests, is over.
2. Completely Stripping the UAE of Legitimacy
Al-Burhan did not merely reject Emirati mediation; he went further:
“The whole world has witnessed that the UAE supports the rebels.”
This sentence — long awaited by much of the Sudanese public — removes any ambiguity that may have existed between the Commander-in-Chief and his people during this defining moment. It elevates the political ceiling, reinforces domestic unity, and sends a message to Washington and Riyadh that Khartoum no longer views the UAE as a neutral diplomatic actor, but as a direct threat to Sudan’s sovereignty.
3. Preempting Efforts to Reconfigure the ‘Quad’
With ongoing attempts — particularly by the U.S.–Saudi sponsors — to revive the Quad or formulate a similar mediation platform, al-Burhan’s position seeks to prevent:
• A repeat of the “Jeddah platform” with non-Sudanese conditions.
• A return of the UAE as a central player shaping outcomes.
• Any settlement that keeps the RSF as a political actor or reproduces its networks.
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Second: Why Did al-Burhan Target Mossad Boulos by Name?
This is an unusual move in dealings with Washington, carrying several implications.
1. Dismantling the Narrative Behind U.S. Reservations
Mossad Boulos has long advanced the claim of “Muslim Brotherhood infiltration” in the army — a narrative aligned with the Emirates’ messaging.
Al-Burhan responded bluntly:
“This is blatant falsehood… an Emirati scarecrow used with Americans, Saudis, and Egyptians.”
This signals that:
• Khartoum wants this issue closed permanently.
• The military leadership views the claim as a direct threat to its legitimacy.
• The army aims to reclaim the initiative in shaping its image before the U.S.
2. Applying Counter-Pressure on Washington
By naming a senior White House advisor, Sudan is signaling its perception that:
• Washington is pursuing a dual policy: verbally condemning RSF atrocities while remaining susceptible to Emirati influence.
• The U.S. still frames the war as a “balance of power issue,” rather than a “militia attacking a sovereign state.”
Al-Burhan’s message:
If Washington wants meaningful engagement in Sudan, it must disengage from Emirati narratives and influence networks.
3. Protecting the “Internal Reform Process” of the Army
When al-Burhan says:
“The army is capable of reforming and restructuring itself.”
He is rejecting externally imposed reform frameworks — driven mainly by Washington and Abu Dhabi — that the army sees as politically motivated rather than professional.
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Third: Messages to the Domestic Audience: The Army Is Not Fighting Tribes
One of the most important pillars of the speech was the assertion that the army is not fighting tribes or communities, coupled with a direct appeal to tribal leaders aligned with Abdelrahim Dagalo, who exploits financial inducements to recruit supporters.
This seeks to:
1. Block the Emirati-American narrative portraying the war as ethnic or tribal.
2. Undermine the remaining social base of the RSF in parts of Darfur and Kordofan through a state-centered discourse rather than counter-mobilization.
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Fourth: Implications for the Future of Mediation Efforts
1. Explicit Exclusion of the UAE
Not only from mediation, but from any role in shaping Sudan’s political future.
2. Strengthening the Role of Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Egypt
But under new Sudanese conditions, higher than those of:
• The Jeddah platform,
• Previous Quad initiatives,
• UN/AU mechanisms influenced — in Khartoum’s view — by Emirati leverage.
3. Preparing for a New Negotiation Framework
This time aligned with the formula:
“Military victory before political settlement.”
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Fifth: Al-Burhan Redefines the War — From a War of Positions to a War of Survival
When he describes the conflict as:
“A battle of dignity… a battle for the survival of the Sudanese people,”
he establishes three strategic principles:
1. No ceasefire without the complete dismantling of the RSF.
2. Any concession on the battlefield threatens the existence of the state.
3. The options are total military victory or a political settlement backed by decisive military success.
This is the first time al-Burhan articulates a comprehensive definition of the war as an existential confrontation backed by external actors through the RSF.
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Sixth: Regional Reading of the Message
• Saudi Arabia may view the speech as indirect support for its efforts with Washington to shape a mediation platform insulated from Emirati influence.
• Egypt may see it as affirmation of its stance regarding the destabilizing role of the UAE in Sudan.
• The UAE might respond through media pressure or by escalating support to the RSF, though the heightened tone of the speech makes any return to the Sudan file difficult without a major reset of its policies.
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Conclusion: A Speech Signaling Entry Into a New Phase
Al-Burhan’s address to senior military leaders represents:
• A message of strength and reassurance to the domestic audience.
• A strategic objection to the UAE’s role.
• A direct challenge to American narratives.
• A reaffirmation that the war will continue until Sudan regains all its territory.
• The drawing of new red lines for any future negotiation process.
It is a speech that declares Khartoum’s refusal to accept biased mediation, external labels that undermine the army’s cohesion, or arrangements that threaten national security. The army sees itself at a decisive moment in which it will no longer allow the recreation of past formulas. And the Commander-in-Chief is now openly leading the confrontation with the UAE in full view of the military establishment.







