From Crisis of Legitimacy to Building Consensus: Toward a Strategic Vision for National Dialogue and Restoring the Stat
23 August, 2026
The wide-ranging response to the article “From the Crisis of Legitimacy to Restoring the State” was not merely an expression of appreciation for an idea or support for a particular position. Rather, it revealed a deeper national need: the need to move from diagnosing the crisis toward building a pathway out of it—one based on consensus and capable of securing broad acceptance among the Sudanese people.
The responses from academics, politicians, diplomats, legal experts, and public affairs figures, both inside and outside Sudan, confirmed that the Sudanese crisis is no longer simply a crisis of war, nor solely a crisis of power or legitimacy. It has become a complex crisis involving the future of the state, the nature of the system of governance, the relationship between the state and society, the management of diversity and resources, and Sudan’s position within its regional and international environment.
There is therefore an urgent need to move the idea from an article that stimulates debate to a vision that opens the way for an organized national dialogue—a dialogue that is not merely another platform for exchanging positions or a conference convened simply to record attendance, but a deliberate strategic process aimed at building consensus around the issues upon which Sudan’s future depends.
What is required is not another repetition of the call for national dialogue, but its transformation from a political idea into a strategic project grounded in common ground and capable of implementation.
From an Individual Initiative to a National Project
The true value of any national initiative is not measured by its author’s ability to defend it, but by its capacity to become a shared public endeavor that transcends individuals, personal ambitions, political currents, and positions.
Accordingly, the next step should not be to produce a closed vision, but rather to open it to a carefully selected group of experts, opinion leaders, academics, politicians, and national figures from inside and outside Sudan through a series of structured and progressive dialogue sessions. In this process, ideas can interact through what is known as interactive dialogue, assumptions can be reviewed, alternatives tested, and visions refined through discussion.
At this critical juncture, Sudan does not need another individual voice, regardless of the value of its contribution, as much as it needs a collective national mind capable of seeing Sudan beyond the current polarization and placing the higher interests of the state above short-term calculations.
The objective, therefore, is not to manufacture artificial consensus, but to build a viable consensus around a minimum set of issues that must not remain hostage to political disputes and narrow interests.
National Dialogue as a Strategic Process
The dialogue we need is not a passing political event, but a national strategic planning process.
Strategic planning here does not mean imposing a predetermined substantive agenda on participants. Rather, it means providing a scientific and methodological framework that allows national issues to be discussed systematically, moving from impressions to information, from positions to alternatives, and from diagnosis to policy.
The process should therefore begin with the formation of a Supreme National Commission, composed of figures renowned for their competence, experience, independence, and integrity. Its role would not be to make decisions on behalf of the Sudanese people, but to lead the process and provide it with a national and methodological framework.
Its responsibilities would include setting the broad parameters of the dialogue, raising public awareness about it, engaging with political, social, and community forces, inviting experts, leaders, and diverse constituencies to participate, and ensuring that the process remains open to Sudan’s genuine diversity and inclusive of its various constituencies rather than relying on symbolic representation.
What Do We Want from the Dialogue?
Before beginning the dialogue, we must know where we want it to lead. This is perhaps one of the first principles imposed by strategic thinking.
There is little value in a dialogue whose desired outcomes are undefined, nor in a long list of issues if it is unclear what we intend to do with them.
Accordingly, the following should be clearly defined:
The mission underpinning the dialogue;
The vision guiding it;
The principles and values governing it;
Its overarching goals and specific objectives;
Its priorities and key themes;
The outcomes it is expected to produce;
The mechanisms for translating its outcomes into policies and decisions.
The ultimate objective is not to produce yet another document to be added to Sudan’s extensive archive of documents. Rather, it is to reach a national vision capable of being transformed into a sustainable political, constitutional, and institutional pathway toward a safe way out of the crisis for the country and its people, bringing an end to their suffering.
Understanding Sudan Before Prescribing a Way Out
No successful strategy can be built without an accurate understanding of the environment in which it operates.
The dialogue should therefore begin with a comprehensive analysis of Sudan’s current reality—politically, security-wise, economically, socially, and institutionally—alongside an assessment of the regional and international environment surrounding the country.
The war can no longer be treated as an exclusively domestic affair detached from its surroundings. Sudan’s future will not be determined solely by developments within its borders. It will also be directly affected by regional transformations, international power competition, Red Sea security, the interests of neighboring states, the flow of arms and money, the political economy of war, and ongoing changes in the international order.
Strategic analysis, however, should not turn into submission to external pressures. Rather, it should seek to understand those pressures and identify the space available for national action in response to them.
The question is therefore not only: What are others doing to Sudan? It is also: What can Sudan itself do within a changing regional and international environment?
Defining the Issues Rather Than Multiplying Them
After understanding the reality comes the most important stage: identifying the major strategic issues around which the dialogue should revolve.
These issues should not be determined according to the agenda of a party, group, or elite, but according to what directly affects the future and integrity of the Sudanese state.
They may include political legitimacy, the form of the state and system of government, political transition, the constitution, relations between the center and the regions, management of diversity, institution-building, security-sector reform, resource management, reconstruction, justice and national reconciliation, peace and foreign relations, and Sudan’s regional and international role.
More important than simply listing these issues, however, is prioritizing them and understanding their interrelationships. Some crises are not independent; rather, they are manifestations of deeper crises and interconnected challenges that require comprehensive solutions.
From Crisis Analysis to a Matrix of Strategic Options
This is where the importance of strategic planning tools becomes apparent, including the analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats—not as academic exercises, but as instruments that can support decision-making.
Despite the scale of the catastrophe and the threats surrounding it, Sudan still possesses significant strengths: an exceptional geographical location, abundant natural resources, considerable human and cultural depth, state institutions that can be rebuilt, a broad civil society, and a large Sudanese diaspora whose knowledge and capabilities can contribute to national recovery.
At the same time, weaknesses cannot be ignored. These include institutional fragility, political and social divisions, economic deterioration, the consequences of war, and accumulated structural imbalances in the relationship between the state, society, and the surrounding environment.
There are also opportunities that must be transformed into policies, as well as threats that must be anticipated before they develop into new crises.
The purpose of this analysis, therefore, must ultimately be to produce clear strategic options—not merely diagnoses without solutions.
A National Reference Framework for Dialogue
National dialogue cannot proceed without a reference framework.
This does not mean a partisan document or political program, but rather a system of overarching national principles, values, and guidelines agreed upon by the participants and serving as the basis for dialogue on governance, policies, legislation, resource management, and foreign relations.
Among the most important principles are the unity and sovereignty of Sudan, equal citizenship, the rule of law, respect for diversity, peaceful transfer of power, protection of national institutions, justice, participation, and rejection of violence and exclusion—while recognizing that political disagreement is an inherent right, not a threat to the state.
Such a framework enables the dialogue to move beyond the traditional question of “Who governs?” toward the more important questions: How should the state be governed? For what purpose? And through which institutions?
The State First
The genuine starting point for national consensus should be a redefinition of the center of the crisis: a crisis of the state before it is a crisis of power.
Power changes. Governments come and go. The state, however, must endure and remain sustainable.
The dialogue should therefore focus on rebuilding state institutions, enhancing their efficiency, clarifying their roles, and strengthening their capacity to protect citizens, manage resources, provide services, and safeguard national sovereignty.
It should also address the role of political and community leaders, as well as the state itself, and explore ways to improve their performance. Institutional reform cannot be separated from reforming the political culture that governs those institutions.
A Multi-Level Dialogue
To prevent the dialogue from becoming a closed elite gathering, it should be designed across multiple levels.
There should be an expert dialogue to formulate alternatives, a political dialogue to discuss strategic options, a community dialogue to incorporate the voices of different social groups, and a dedicated track for Sudanese abroad, who represent an important component of the country’s human, intellectual, and political capital.
The process must be inclusive, representative, and open to the broad spectrum of Sudanese society.
Nor should the dialogue be confined to a single session or a short-lived conference. It should instead be a gradual process extending across several sessions and stages, with each stage producing outcomes that can be reviewed and developed in the following stage.
The goal is not to reach a quick and fragile agreement, but to build deep and sustainable consensus.
The Plan Before Implementation
One of the most important lessons to be learned is that the dialogue itself requires a strategic plan and an implementation program with defined timelines.
Calls for participation should not begin before agreement has been reached on the rules governing the process. Detailed issues should not be addressed before defining the overall vision, principles, and objectives. Recommendations should not be produced before identifying the mechanisms capable of translating them into reality.
The strategic plan for the national dialogue should therefore be developed first and agreed upon by the participating constituencies before the process enters its implementation phase.
The plan could include the institutional structure, levels of dialogue, criteria for selecting participants, decision-making mechanisms, procedures for managing differences, a timeline, communication channels, documentation tools, technical support, and mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of outcomes.
Toward an Initiative That Transcends Its Founders
What is being proposed here is neither a ready-made project nor a definitive prescription for Sudan’s crisis. It is a call to open a pathway for organized and profound national thinking.
The true value of the initiative will lie in its ability to bring together people with diverse ideas and expertise and to move Sudanese discourse from a cycle of reaction toward strategic action—with genuine Sudanese ownership and broad participation.
The next phase should therefore not be about monopolizing the initiative, but about freeing it from its original author so that it can become the property of everyone who believes that Sudan can find a third path between war and division, between temporary settlements and the reproduction of crisis, and toward shaping its future.
The objective is not to agree on everything; that is impossible in a country of Sudan’s diversity, history, and complexity.
What we must agree on is what we cannot afford to disagree about: the survival of the state, the unity of Sudan, its sovereignty, and the right of its citizens to security, stability, dignity, citizenship, and peaceful coexistence—and that our disagreements should concern how the state is governed, not whether it exists.
Above all, the goal must be comprehensive peace and national reconciliation.
A Final Word
The past years have demonstrated that managing crises through partial solutions, temporary settlements, and competing claims to legitimacy is no longer sufficient.
Sudan needs to move from crisis management to managing the future, from reaction to anticipation, and from competing over the state to reaching consensus on how to build and preserve it.
If the article “From the Crisis of Legitimacy to Restoring the State” sought to open a window in the wall of crisis, the next step should be to build the road through which we can pass and bridge the obstacles along the way.
That road cannot be built by an individual, a political party, or a single institution. It must be built through an informed national dialogue, guided by knowledge, governed by the national interest, supported by strategic planning methodology, and shaped by Sudan’s intellectuals and expertise both at home and abroad.
Ultimately, the real challenge is not to write yet another document about Sudan, but to produce a vision that the state can adopt, society can rally around, political forces can find common ground within, and future generations can regard as the beginning of a different trajectory for the Sudanese state.
The strategic equation that should guide this initiative is:
Not dialogue to manage division, but dialogue to build consensus; not consensus to dismantle the nation, but consensus to build the state; and not a vision of the future written for elites, but a national project that restores Sudan’s capacity to shape its own future.
Sudan’s leaders and people stand before a historic turning point. At moments of great national crisis and transformation, relinquishing some positions is not a surrender of the nation. Rather, holding firmly to what unites us is the greatest victory.
The middle path does not mean standing between right and right; it means creating a common space in which everyone relinquishes part of what they seek so that the nation can gain what it needs.
In clearer terms:
“When the divide between different constituencies widens, mutual concessions become a bridge rather than a defeat. The middle path becomes the road on which no side triumphs over another, but the nation triumphs over its crisis.”
And, in conclusion, I say to our nation and to its leaders, across all their political and intellectual orientations:
“A national project is not born when one side defeats the others. It is born when everyone realizes that mutual concessions carry a lower cost than continued division. Consensus does not mean that every side gets what it wants; it means that everyone gives up enough so that the nation can receive what it deserves.”






