From Truce to the Security Council: Is U.S. Mediation in Sudan Losing Its Neutrality?
04 October, 2026
Khartoum – Sudanow
From Pressuring the Government to Reshaping the Balance of the War: A U.S. Approach Raising Questions Beyond a Ceasefire
The disagreement between Khartoum and Washington over the war in Sudan is no longer a dispute over the details or duration of a truce. In recent weeks, the disagreement has broadened to encompass the very nature of a political settlement, the position of the Sudanese state in the equation, the limits of international pressure on the government, and the future of the parallel armed force challenging the state.
Recent developments reveal a widening gap between Washington's stated desire to end the war and the way its political and diplomatic tools are being deployed within the Sudanese crisis.
On the one hand, the U.S. administration has proposed a 90-day truce followed by a political and negotiating process. On the other, Washington has pressured Sudan's leadership to accept the proposal, to the point of linking the issue of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council chairman's visa to the United Nations to his position on the U.S. plan.
The Security Council has added another layer of pressure by proposing that the arms embargo be expanded from Darfur to the entire country, while also expanding the mandate of the Panel of Experts and tightening monitoring mechanisms. These proposals failed to secure consensus, forcing the Council in September to settle for a short extension until October 9.
The question therefore becomes legitimate: Is Washington still acting as a mediator seeking to bridge differences and maintain balance, or is it beginning to act as a political actor seeking to reshape the conditions of negotiations before talks even begin?
The Problem Is Not the Truce, but How It Is Engineered
There is no disagreement that a ceasefire is a necessary objective and that protecting civilians and ending the war should be priorities. But a truce cannot be treated as an abstract value detached from its conditions and the parties between whom it is negotiated.
A truce that leads to the withdrawal of irregular forces from cities, halts the flow of external arms, and reopens the way toward a unified state is fundamentally different from a truce that freezes existing lines of control and subsequently transfers them to the negotiating table as political facts.
This is precisely where Khartoum's objection to the U.S. proposal lies.
According to Reuters, the Sudanese government submitted input and amendments to the U.S. proposal, foremost among them the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from urban areas under UN supervision. Khartoum, however, believes that these demands have not received the response it expected, prompting the government to warn that the current formula could lead to a model similar to Libya if Washington insists on its approach.
From the Sudanese government's perspective, therefore, the question is not simply: Do we want the war to end?
It is:
Should ending the war lead to dismantling the presence of an externally supported armed force, or should it lead to institutionalizing the coexistence of a regular army and a rebellion and subsequently transforming both into politically equal parties?
That is a fundamental distinction.
When Pressure Becomes Uneven
The most sensitive issue in the U.S. approach is the balance of pressure and neutrality in its mediation.
If Washington considers both sides responsible for prolonging the war and for violations, then the logic of mediation requires political and diplomatic pressure to be distributed across the parties responsible for the conflict and their external backers. Demands concerning a cessation of hostilities, withdrawal and an end to external support should also distinguish clearly between the state and the rebellion and should be specific and measurable.
What concerns Khartoum, however, is that the most visible tools currently appear to be directed toward persuading the government to accept what it considers a flawed truce formula, while there is no equally visible and parallel U.S. pressure on the RSF rebellion to accept the conditions that the government regards as essential to peace.
At this point, the issue is no longer merely political; it becomes a question of the neutrality of the mediation itself.
A mediator does not lose neutrality simply because he applies pressure for peace. Rather, the mediator begins to lose credibility when the legitimate government feels that it is being asked to make the fundamental concessions while the demands of the other side are treated as realities that must simply be accommodated, with the armed group effectively rewarded for its crimes rather than held accountable.
This is precisely the dilemma facing Massad Boulos.
An envoy seeking to bring Sudanese parties together around a settlement must convince the government that Washington is not seeking to impose a predetermined political formula, but is genuinely attempting to narrow the differences between the parties.
He must also avoid becoming more of a sponsor of the rebellion than its regional sponsor itself.
If the state becomes convinced that the mediator first wants it to accept the truce and only afterward discuss its conditions, while preserving the political and military position of the rebel side, then mediation effectively shifts from facilitating negotiations to managing pressure and adopting the narrative promoted by the UAE.
The Security Council: The Link That Cannot Be Separated from the Truce Initiative
This is why the Security Council session on October 9 assumes particular importance.
Security Council Resolution 2828, adopted on September 11, extended the sanctions regime concerning Sudan until October 9, while extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts until November 9.
The negotiations preceding the resolution, however, revealed clear divisions over the U.S. proposal to expand the arms embargo to the entire country, broaden the mandate of the Panel of Experts, and include drones and their dual-use components.
Analyses monitoring the Council indicate that the United States continues to push for an expansion of the sanctions regime, while other countries have opposed such an expansion, warning that additional coercive measures could increase the risks of Sudan's fragmentation.
The international community therefore should not remain passive in the face of what is being openly engineered.
The October 9 session should consequently not be viewed as a technical matter separate from the truce initiative.
The two tracks converge around one fundamental question:
Who should be pressured to end the war, and how?
If Washington pressures the government to accept a truce while simultaneously pushing at the Security Council for broader restrictions on Sudan's military environment, while the question of the future of forces operating outside state authority is deferred to a later political phase, Khartoum will interpret this as an imbalance in the mediation and its impartiality.
A No-Fly Zone: From Ending the War to Restricting the State's Tools
The issue becomes even more sensitive if proposals for a nationwide no-fly zone return to the forefront of international discussions.
Such a measure, if applied across Sudan, would not be merely a humanitarian measure. It would have direct military consequences, particularly in a geographically expansive war in which the Sudanese Armed Forces rely on air power to confront irregular forces operating across vast areas, including parts of Darfur and Kordofan.
This raises an objective question that should not be buried beneath the slogan of civilian protection:
If the state is prevented from using its air capabilities, what equivalent mechanism would prevent external support from reaching irregular forces, or prevent their movement, redeployment and resupply with weapons and military equipment?
The troubling aspect is that restrictions would be imposed on the state, while all enforcement and monitoring mechanisms would effectively be directed at it.
The practical outcome would be to reduce the state's military capabilities while the irregular side, under what has been described as the Boulos truce formula, retains its ground structure, support networks and positions.
An allegedly "neutral" measure could therefore produce a distinctly non-neutral effect.
This is at the heart of Sudan's concerns.
From the Emirati Narrative to an International Narrative?
There is a deeper political dimension to this debate.
Khartoum has argued since the beginning of the war that one of the fundamental problems with the international approach has been the political equation that places the state and the rebellion on an equal footing, rather than distinguishing between the state and its institutions on one side and an armed force in rebellion against it on the other.
The government believes that some regional and international approaches have reproduced this concept in different forms: two warring parties, two parties that must negotiate, and ultimately a new political authority capable of incorporating both.
From Khartoum's perspective, however, the problem is that such a process could end up rewarding an armed force that has imposed an enormous burden on the country and its people, transforming the military realities it created on the ground into political capital at the negotiating table.
One does not necessarily have to fully adopt the Sudanese government's narrative to recognize the core issue.
The objective question is:
Does the settlement process dismantle the duality of armed power, or does it politically redefine and institutionalize it?
That is the real test of any peace initiative.
Is Boulos Leaning Toward One Side of the Conflict?
Based solely on publicly available facts, it would be premature to conclude that Massad Boulos has adopted an openly declared project in favor of the RSF rebellion and its declared or undeclared sponsors.
It can, however, be argued that the design of the U.S. approach, as reflected in some of its elements, is increasingly creating the perception within the Sudanese government that the cost of rejecting the proposal falls almost exclusively on Khartoum.
That distinction matters.
Foreign policy is measured not only by what parties say about their intentions, but also by what the other side perceives in the distribution of incentives and pressures.
If the government is pressured to accept a truce, faces the possibility of broader sanctions and international military restrictions, while the political future of the RSF rebellion and its allies remains open within the negotiating process, the impression will deepen that the mediation is not beginning from a neutral starting point aimed at peace and stability, but from an effort to rearrange the balance of negotiations before the parties even sit at the table.
This may explain the increasingly firm tone of Sudan's recent statements and its rejection of the U.S. approach, which Khartoum sees as reflecting the interests of the UAE and the rebellion.
Sudan Rejects the Formula — But Does Not Close the Door
The more accurate reading of Sudan's position, however, is not that Khartoum has chosen war over peace.
Rather, it is rejecting a particular formula while keeping the door open to negotiations that recognize the sovereignty of the state and the authority of its existing institutions.
This is a point that Sudanese diplomacy should capitalize on.
Instead of simply rejecting the U.S. initiative, Khartoum could present a clear counterproposal based on objective criteria:
1. A time-limited humanitarian ceasefire.
2. The withdrawal of RSF forces from cities and residential areas under international monitoring.
3. The opening of humanitarian corridors without using humanitarian assistance as a political tool.
4. An end to external support for the rebellion.
5. An agreed regional mechanism for verification and compliance.
6. Strengthening a broad Sudanese political process after security arrangements, disarmament, demobilization and integration have been established.
7. Affirming the unity of the state and its institutions and rejecting the establishment of parallel authorities.
Through such an approach, Khartoum would move from merely opposing a U.S. initiative to becoming the author of an alternative vision for peace.
Scenarios After October 9
1. Adjustment of the U.S. Approach
Washington may recognize that increasing pressure on the government is undermining the mediation itself and move toward a more balanced formula that places comparable pressure on the rebellion and its external supporters and makes the withdrawal of RSF forces from cities a central component of the truce.
2. Continued Pressure Policy
Washington may continue pushing for an expansion of sanctions and monitoring mechanisms while simultaneously pressuring Khartoum to accept the truce.
In that case, the trust gap is likely to widen, and Boulos could increasingly be viewed by Khartoum as part of the pressure mechanism rather than as an impartial mediator.
3. A Compromise at the Security Council
Divisions within the Council could produce a compromise, such as another technical extension or a limited expansion of the sanctions regime rather than the full adoption of the U.S. proposal.
This scenario is supported by the divisions that emerged during the September negotiations.
4. The Dispute Moves to a Broader Level
If tougher measures at the Security Council coincide with continued U.S. pressure on Sudan's leadership, relations between Washington and Khartoum could shift from a disagreement over a peace initiative to a strategic dispute over the definition of the Sudanese state and the future of its military and political institutions.
This could potentially lead to the use of a veto by one of the parties.
At that point, the mediation itself would be in crisis.
Conclusion: Peace Cannot Be Built Through Mediation That Targets the Legitimate Party
The most dangerous outcome for the U.S. initiative is not necessarily its rejection by Khartoum, but the erosion of trust in the mediator's neutrality and acceptability.
Peace requires not only a workable plan, but also a mediator trusted by the state—one who understands the consequences of the war and does not seek to impose a predetermined outcome upon it.
From this perspective, the linkage between pressure on General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan over the visa issue, the 90-day truce initiative, U.S. efforts at the Security Council to expand sanctions, and discussions surrounding restrictions on Sudan's airspace helps explain why Sudanese concerns are growing that the truce may be part of an effort to reshape the balance of the war rather than simply stop it.
Yet the political danger begins when the outcomes of different instruments converge, even if their stated intentions do not.
If pressure falls disproportionately on the government, if its military capabilities are restricted, if the parallel armed force retains its areas of influence, and if the two sides subsequently enter a political process based on the realities created on the battlefield, the likely result will be a settlement that begins from the balance of power produced by the war.
The government's warning about a possible Libyan model therefore deserves serious consideration—not as a categorical accusation against the United States, but as a warning that managing the war in an unbalanced manner could produce a fragile peace and a political order built on division rather than one that ends it.
A mediation that pressures one party to accept peace without ensuring that the other party pays a comparable price for peace has not necessarily brought the parties closer to a settlement. It may instead have redistributed the cost of the settlement while postponing the underlying solution.
This is the question that should remain before Washington ahead of October 9:
Does the United States want to end the war in Sudan, or does it first want to reshape the conditions of the conflict in accordance with its own objectives?
The difference between the two is not merely semantic. It is the difference between mediation that builds peace and a policy that reshapes the conflict—and its consequences for Sudan's future.
Sudan, for its part, should take the initiative in developing a path consistent with its national interests, national security and the prevailing domestic will.
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