Halayb and Fashagah between Nile Water Hammer and Renaissance Dam Anvil (**)
13 December, 2013Khartoum, (Sudanow)- Political developments and the decisions on the international waterways greatly intertwine in most nations of the globe that share such waterways, but this interlock is more visible in the Nile Basin area.
Sudanese history books relate that Mohamed Ali Pasha occupied the Sudan in 1820 in search of gold and men but in fact the goal of the invasion was to reach the Nile sources and annex them, along with the Sudan, to his new empire to make sure that all the waters of the Nile river would reach Egypt.
For this reason, Mohamed Ali Pasha dispatched explorers, administrators and armies to South Sudan and from there to central Africa in quest of the Nile sources, to occupy and secure them, before sending his men to Beni Shangoul Mountains for gold prospection.
This was also the reason behind the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in 1898, as the first order to Lord Kitchener, after getting a firm grip on Khartoum, and well prior to taking security measures, for his soldiers, was to sail southwards and expel the French contingent that arrived and took control of Fashodah on the White Nile in South Sudan, and then they had to drive the Belgians from Rajaf region on the Bahr al-Jebel River. The aim of the two expeditions was to exercise full British control over the Nile, starting from its sources in Lake Victoria down to its mouth at the Mediterranean, in Egypt.
Relations between Egypt and the West worsened and the struggle of the then super-powers over the River Nile continued. After the tripartite offensive on Egypt in 1956, the Soviet Union got involved in the Nile water and announced the agreement for financing and constructing the High Dam. This was a dramatic development that inflamed the cold war that was raging at the time. The reaction by the United States of America was dispatching American experts to Addis Ababa to embark on intensive studies on dams, which could be built on the Blue Nile, Atbara and Sobat rivers.
When late President Mohamed Anwar Sadaat expelled the Soviet experts from Egypt in 1972, after having completed the High Dam, Moscow shortly afterwards, sent a large number of those experts to Addis Ababa in support of Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam who had seized power in Ethiopia. The studies on the Ethiopian dams were finalized, but due to its wars against Eritrea and Somalia, its internal disputes and dismal poverty at the time, Ethiopia could not implement those plans. Moreover, the Soviets were not prepared to finance and build another dam after the High Dam experience; but their mere presence at the Blue Nile sources was adequate to incite concern and anxiety in Cairo and the capitals of the West.
The intertwining of the Nile water with the political developments has continued in several areas; but let us get quickly on board the boat of incidents that gained pace in the Nile Basin in the first week of December 2013.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn arrived in Sudan on December 3, 2013, for a visit that was extensively covered by the local, regional and international media, and he visited Gadarif region and Merowe Dam. Sudan and Ethiopia concluded 13 agreements, including a deal on an electricity network linking the two countries under which Ethiopia will sell the Sudan 100 megawatts that will gradually increase to reach 300 megawatts of the electric current. The two countries also signed an agreement ending their dispute over Fashagah region. The Fashagah question has thus surfaced after long silence on the part of the Sudan.
But the most important part of the visit was Sudan’s support that was clearly uttered by President Omar Al-Bashir himself on December 4, 2013 to the construction of the Renaissance Dam. This support had put an end to the state of confusion by the Sudan towards the Dam over the past two years. That confusion was largely due to Sudan’s close relationship with Egypt which is strongly opposed to the Dam. President Bashir has explained that his country’s support to the Ethiopian Dam was not for political reasons, in an obvious reference to the recent developments in Egypt in which the army toppled the Islamic regime of President Mohamed Mursi.
For this reason, former Sudanese Minister for Water Resources and Electricity, Osama Abdullah, travelled to Egypt one day ahead of Desalegn’s arrival in Khartoum. According to the official reports, the purpose of the visit was coordination of the Sudanese-Egyptian position in connection with the River Nile and the Renaissance Dam. But it seems that the real purpose of that visit was to pacify the Egyptian side about the expected visit by the Ethiopian Prime Minister to the Sudan. Yet, the meeting of the Sudanese Minister with his Egyptian counterpart Mohamed Abdul Mutalab did not cool down Egyptian anger and worry about the new Sudanese-Ethiopian rapprochement as was reflected in the Egyptian statements and comments.
The questions of the Nile water, the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Fashagah region dominated the two visits and the incidents in the three countries during that week. But a great absentee from those developments and the two visits was the Halayeb dispute.
This in my opinion explains the development of the events culminating into the Sudan’s support to the Renaissance Dam and the birth of the new Sudanese-Ethiopian alliance, in return for an agreement between the two parties on Fashagah region as is discussed in this article.
Fashagah:
The Fashagah region lies in the northeastern part of the Sudan, to the west of the Ethiopian border and immediately south of the Sudanese border with Eritrea. Like Halayeb Triangle, the greater part of Fashagah region takes the shape of a triangle with Setit River forming its northern side and Atbara River its western side while the Ethiopian border its eastern side. Its size is around 250 square kilometers but, being an agricultural region, Fashagah is also measured in feddans, and is about 600,000 feddans (acres), It is divided by the Basalam River with the greater Fashagah lying north of this river and smaller Fashagah north of it. Besides Atbara, Setit and Baslaam rivers, heavy rains fall from June to September each year, making the region rich in water resources and, with its fertile lands and moderate climate, it is among the Sudanese regions of the highest production for sorghum, sesame and short-staple cotton.
The 1902 border agreement with Ethiopia placed Fashagah region inside the Sudan but Ethiopian farmers who were in the region remained there, while others began to infiltrate to it and engage in disputes with the Sudanese farmers there, and were sometimes protected by Ethiopian army units. The infiltration and settlement by the Ethiopians in Fashagah region have continued over the years.
And despite the fact that the agreement that was reached by Emperor Haile Selassie and former President Jaafer Nimeri in 1972 confirmed that Fashagah is part of the Sudan, the Ethiopians continued to infiltrate into the Sudanese territories, seize and cultivate the land. This transgression extended westwards up to Atbara River but the successive Khartoum governments ignored this situation, encouraging the Ethiopian farmers and Addis Ababa governments, to continue drifting and settling in Fashagah region.
It appears that the location of the region in the vicinity of Ethiopia and its isolation by rivers, valleys and mountains, coupled with pre-occupations of the Sudanese governments with the wars in the South and then in Darfur, made Khartoum turn a blind eye to the Ethiopian presence in the region. It also seems that Ethiopia was planning to barter Fashagah lands with other border areas contested by the two countries. Therefore, formations and meetings of committees continued, with statements made repeatedly on an imminent settlement of the Fashagah dispute.
Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Ambassador to Khartoum gave a statement in April 2010 in which he agreed that Fashagah is part of the Sudan. He emphasized the firm bonds linking the two countries together. Nevertheless, Ethiopian presence in Fashagah continued.
During that period, the developments in the River Nile sped up: Ethiopia exploded a bombshell in April 2011 by declaring commencement of building the Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, 40 kilometers away from the Sudanese border, which will be the biggest dam in Africa and the 10th in the world. In May 2013, it blew up yet a bigger bombshell by declaring diversion of the Blue Nile runway to start work on the Dam. A month later, in June 2013, Egypt declared its absolute opposition to the construction of the Dam and its preparedness for an armed confrontation for stopping the process.
But it was not sheer coincidence for Ethiopia to choose the two dates. Egypt has begun at the time to sink in political and economic crises a year after the ouster of President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak. This was followed by the deposition by the army of President Mohamed Mursi. The Sudan’s stance was inflicted with a great confusion (or changing roles?) from supporting the Dam one day to opposing it the other day.
Months after declaring the construction of the Renaissance Dam, Ethiopia raised the Fashagah card by once again announcing that the region belongs to the Sudan and that it is ready for negotiations. Moreover, after the secession of South Sudan, the dispute over the border Ilemi Triangle was no longer a matter of concern for Khartoum and Addis Ababa, and the issue has become of concern to Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Juba (instead of Khartoum).
Following the Ethiopian declaration of building the Renaissance Dam, visits continued to be paid to the Sudan by late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawe and his successor Haile Mariam Desalegn, and were followed by several visits by President Bashir to Ethiopia and his generous donation for founding Meles Zenawe cultural center.
Then came the historic visit paid by Prime Minister, Desalegn, to Khartoum on December 3rd 2013, as was referred to above, and the signing of 13 agreements, including the settlement of the dispute over Fashagah region and the other border areas. This was followed by the clear declaration by President Bashir on the second day of Desalegn visit, December 4, in support of the Renaissance Dam, and confirmation of the tremendous benefits the Sudan would gain from the Dam.
President Bashir further declared that Takazi Dam that was built by Ethiopia on Atbara River in 2011 would increase the hydro-electric power to be generated by Setit/Upper Atbara Dam in the Sudan from 120 to 320 megawatts as the Takazi Dam would regulate the flow of Atbara River throughout the year instead of its seasonal flow between June and October before construction of Takazi Dam. Similarly, the power generation at Merowe Dam will also be increased as the Renaissance Dam will regulate the flow of the Blue Nile throughout the year instead of current seasonal flow. The Renaissance Dam will therefore help resolve Merowe Dam problems and raise its generation capacity.
Was the Fashagah deal the main carrot that persuaded the Sudan to declare its support to the Renaissance Dam as announced by President Bashir in clear-cut terms? The observer will not fail to discern this link (along with other reasons, of course), particularly when a comparison is made between the developments in Fashagah and those which have occurred in Halayeb.
Halayeb Triangle cover an area of I20,580 square kilometer (about two times the area of Abyei as determined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2009, and 80 times the area of Fashagah region). The Halayeb Triangle lies north of 22 Latitude North, overlooking the Red Sea along 6,000 kilometers. Being located on the Red Sea coast, the Triangle will have tremendous marine rights to be earned by the country which includes the Triangle within its territories.
SudanowArticleRenaissanceDam2.doc
SudanowArticleRenaissanceDam2.doc
The Halayeb dispute erupted at the beginning of 1958 when Egypt decided to conduct a referendum on unity with Syria in each of the two countries, including Halayeb. The Sudan objected to this measure, reminding Egypt that Halayeb is a Sudanese territory. In response, Egypt argued that Latitude 22 North is the borderline between the two countries and that it is a red line that could not be crossed and, therefore, Halayeb is an Egyptian territory.
The Sudan insisted that the Triangle is part of its territories and that it would conduct its parliamentary elections in Halayeb on schedule in February of that year (1958). The dispute got heated and Egypt dispatched a military contingent to the Triangle and so did the Sudan. The then Sudanese Foreign Minister, Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, travelled to Egypt and met President Jamal Abdul Nassir who suggested that both the Egyptian referendum and the Sudanese elections be suspended in the contested territory and that the question be discussed after the end of the two exercises.
However, the Government of Abdullah Khalil turned down the proposal and lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council on February 20, 1958. Egypt reversed its decision of holding the referendum and, as announced by its UN Security Council Representative Omar Lutfi, permitted the Sudan to conduct its elections in the territory. Egypt stopped its referendum arrangements and withdrew its military contingent from Halayeb, and the Security Council withheld the Sudan complaint.
Everyone gave out a sigh of relief; the Sudanese thought that Halayeb was returned to them, complete and safe, and that the relationship with the brothers and sisters in Egypt was restored to normal. Rejoice and celebrations prevailed all over the country and the popularity of the Prime Minister and his party soared due to the fast and decisive victory.
The question is: What were President Abdul Nassir and his advisers contemplating when they decided to pull out of Halayeb?
The High Dam project and the relocation of Wadi Halfa inhabitants must have been the main reason for the concessions they made on the issue of Halayeb in February 1958. It was illogical, neither politically or practically for Egypt to stick to the occupation of Halayeb and ask the Sudan to submerge Halfa and its villages for building the High Dam. For this reason, Egypt decided to take into consideration a higher and more important interest and withdraw from Halayeb with the hope of obtaining agreement by the Sudan for construction of the High Dam and submergence of Halfa city and 27 villages surrounding it along with 200,000 feddans (acres) of fertile lands. This was exactly what happened when the government of General Ibrahim Abbood in 1959 signed the Nile Water Agreement and agreed on the submergence of Wadi Halfa and its villages and on coerced relocation of about 50,000 Sudanese Nubians. Furthermore, Egypt consented to relocation of three villages (Surrah, Faras and Debairah), which were north of Latitude 22 North, along with the other Sudanese villages to Khashm al-Girbah region in east Sudan. This relocation and Egypt’s consent to it undermined Egypt’s allegation of the sanctity of Latitude 22N as a borderline between the two countries.
Would it have been possible for General Abbood’s government to agree to the submergence of Halfa and its villages if President Abdul Nassir had insisted on occupation of Halayeb region? I don’t believe anybody could expect this would have happened.
One other question that arises is: Why didn’t the government of Abdullah Khalil insisted on signing an agreement (or even exchanging memoranda) with Egypt on the final status of Halayeb and its belonging to the Sudan, instead of accepting verbal Egyptian assurances?
Halayeb remained under the full Sudanese administration from 1958 until 1992 when Egypt, in the wake of deterioration of the relations between the two countries and confiscation of the Egyptian assets in the Sudan by the Ingaz (salvation) government, decided that Halayeb is an Egyptian territory. Egypt declared its formal annexation in 1995 in the wake of an abortive assassination attempt on the life of President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in which a group of leaders of the Ingaz government and the ruling party were accused of involvement.
After the Egyptian occupation of Halayeb in 1995, dumb Sudanese silence engulfed both the government and opposition until a visit to the Sudan by former Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi April 5, 2013. During that visit he announced his willingness to turn Halayeb back to the Sudan. However, this announcement was immediately and totally rejected in Egypt and the Egyptian army quickly intervened. General Sisse, even before ousting Mursi and assuming power, dispatched General Sidqi Subhi to the Sudan, less than three weeks after Mursi’s visit, conveying a clear-cut, specific and direct message from the Defense Minister, Lt. Gen. Abdul Fattah Sisse to his Sudanese counterpart related to Halayeb and Shalatin. Sisse vowed in that message that the Egyptian armed forces would never relinquish a single span of that territory. This rigid position of the Egyptian army was supported by all Egyptian parties and organizations (the rightists, leftist, religious and secular ones).
Gen. Sisse reiterated this absolute stance towards Halayeb issue last August, one month after his seizure of power and ouster of President Mursi, July 3, 2013. In fact, a watcher of the political developments in Egypt might have observed that Halayeb was among the justifications for seizure of power and ouster of President Mursi.
When it occupied Halayeb in 1992, Egypt did not need the Sudan for building the High Dam or for granting it a water loan. The High Dam was completed in 1971 and the Sudan did not ask Egypt to give back the Nile water loan which was supposed to end in 1977.
Moreover, the Sudan has failed to use its share of the Nile water and began to supply Egypt each year with 6.5 billion cubic meters of its share which it could not utilize over the past five decades, despite allegations by the former Irrigation ministers and their advisers about integrated water plans and strategies.
Egypt has repeatedly rejected negotiations on Halayeb or taking the dispute to the international arbitration. This was plainly announced by those who are in power now (and a number of Egyptian writers) asserting that the Halayeb Dossier was closed and would never be reopened.
For its part, Ethiopia continued alleging that it is ready for negotiation on Fashagah and followed this with an agreement the details of which we do not know. However, it seems Ethiopia has given back part of the region, if not all of it. The price was the clear support by President Bashir to the Renaissance Dam. We hope the government would reveal the Fashagah deal for the Sudanese people to get to know its full contents.
Would the Fashagah deal, the support to the Renaissance Dam and the new Sudanese-Ethiopian alliance imply the loss of Halayeb from the Sudan? Has the government decided that the possibility of retrieving Halayeb has diminished and that it would be best for it to barter the support to the Renaissance Dan for restoration of the Fashagah after it was convinced that it would not retrieve Halayeb by opposition to the Renaissance Dam?
Or will Egypt, after the Renaissance Dam has become a matter of fact that has now been supported by the Sudan, (and Egypt has become the single opponent among the 11 Nile Basin member states), accept the Ethiopian offer made to it and to the Sudan for sharing the financing, administration and ownership of the Renaissance Dam? Furthermore, is Egypt willing for serious cooperation on the Nile water and on other issues and disputes (including Halayeb question)?
What has happened during the first week of December in the Nile Basin is undoubtedly a tremendous development that clearly demonstrates the firm link between politics and international waters. Nonetheless, the upcoming months and events (including the meeting of the Renaissance Dam tripartite committee) may offer answers to these questions.
END
MAS/MOA
(**) news reports in the magazine reflect the views of the writers
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